Proposed Road Safety Strategy Consultation Report

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9. Other matters raised during consultation

During the consultation process, many people raised concerns about, or made suggestions for improving, road safety. The list below contains those matters to which it was considered a response was required, either to illustrate how the Strategy can respond to the matter identified, or because the suggestion raised research or policy-related matters requiring some explanation.

The matters below were either raised by a substantial proportion of participants in the consultation process, or were raised by just a small number of participants but were significant matters in their own right. A commentary in response to each point is shown in italics.

The proposed goal

• The gap between the present initiatives and the goal is smaller than is indicated in the strategy documents, because the traffic growth predictions are too high. The UK expects traffic growth to slow due to higher levels of car ownership, rising congestion, and policies to increase public transport use. A more appropriate estimate of traffic growth would be 2%. In addition, the proposed Strategy undervalues the social cost reductions expected from recent enforcement initiatives such as the booze buses, the vehicle impoundment regime, and the highway patrol.
  
  • The UK is not a good comparison country for congestion. New Zealand's road network is far less congested than that in the UK, meaning that congestion is less likely to be such a major issue here.
    
    
  • The UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions estimate of 2% per year traffic growth was based on a number of underlying assumptions, one of which was an annual average population growth of less than 0.1%. Statistics NZ estimates (medium growth) put New Zealand's annual growth rate between now and 2010 at about 0.8%.
    
    
  • With less congestion and a much higher population growth than the UK, an annual traffic growth rate of 2% seems unrealistic. However, one of the strengths of the strategy development process is that the validity of the underlying assumptions can be revisited during the lifetime of the Strategy.
    
    
  • Traffic growth over the last 10 years has averaged approximately 3.8% per annum. It is appropriate to assume that this level of growth (rather than 2%) will continue in the future.
    
    
  • The model developed for the proposed Strategy has taken into account estimates for both changes in population projections and changes in mobility. Over the last decade, mobility (vehicle-kilometres travelled per head of population) increases have averaged 2.5%. Mobility increases, at 10-yearly intervals over the last 20 years, range from 1% to 3.5%. We have used 2.5% as the best estimate for mobility, with 1.5% being the low and 3.5% being the maximum.
    
    
  • The new highway patrol is estimated to save between 30 and 45 lives a year. When estimating the extra enforcement resources required for the proposed Strategy, these new highway patrol savings were taken into account. The value of the vehicle impoundment regime and the booze buses was also taken into account in the development of the proposed Strategy.
    
    
• In determining our overall goal for road safety by 2010, we need to be careful when comparing ourselves with other countries. Comparisons with other countries can be flawed — countries such as Norway and Sweden have greater GDPs and can therefore invest more in vehicles and roading; other countries have different social structures and population size and dispersal patterns; different climates' and terrains' impact on road safety; and other countries have different driving populations. The overall target should be based on crash rates per unit of travel.
  
  • New Zealand is starting behind the safest countries in the world, and is handicapped by a sparse population and difficult terrain that make it costly to build and police the network. The proposed Strategy does not aim to achieve levels of safety based on what has been achieved elsewhere. Target setting is based on specific interventions, and the reductions in social cost outcomes expected from those interventions by 2010. The Strategy does propose to achieve a level of safety based on what we can do in New Zealand (taking into account the particular nature of our roads and the population), which happens to correspond to a level of safety currently enjoyed by the safest countries in the world.
    
    
  • It is true that some other countries have more money to devote to road safety. However, this is not necessarily the reason for their greater levels of road safety. Other factors such as lower speed limits allow them to achieve higher safety levels.
    
    
  • Fatality targets will be expressed in terms of deaths per 10,000 vehicles and deaths per 100,000 people. Until we have a well-established time series of vehicle-kilometres travelled (VKT) on NZ roads it would be inappropriate to express our targets in terms of crash rates per unit of travel. The commonly-used measure of traffic safety is deaths per 10,000 vehicles, while the death rate per 100,000 population is a measure of the public health burden imposed by road traffic.
    
    
• The Strategy should have a Vision (as well as, or instead of, an overall goal). The Vision can be for a longer term, rather than just for the next 10 years. There should only be one objective: a zero road toll and zero injuries. Some submissions mentioned Sweden's "Vision Zero", others 'continual improvement'.
  
  • After considerable discussion during the development of the proposed Strategy, it was agreed to focus on an accountability-driven goal, expressed in terms of challenging but achievable targets. A vision could be addressed as the final Strategy is developed or in the development of the New Zealand Transport Strategy.
    
    
  • Adopting a "zero" type vision would need to be articulated within an ethical framework addressing the unacceptability of road trauma, and a management framework which explicitly placed safety responsibility on the designers and managers of the transport system.
    
    
• The concept of "safety culture" should continue to be promoted in the Strategy, with a clear focus on changing driver attitudes and behaviours.
  
  • The promotion of a safety culture was a major focus of the previous National Road Safety Plan 1995, which stated that a safety culture "will be evident where high-risk behaviour, including drink driving and speeding, is socially unacceptable as a result of greater community awareness and education, peer-group pressure and widespread implementation of measures aimed at deterring offenders." The proposed Strategy aims to provide new impetus to further improve safety knowledge and attitudes so that safe behaviours are considered the norm, and high-risk behaviours socially unacceptable and so improve 'safety culture'. Further education investment can assist this. Beyond this, the proposed Strategy adopts a 'total safety perspective' approach, similar to those being implemented in the world's safest countries. The proposed Strategy aims to position New Zealand for the period beyond 2010, by laying the foundation for the next generation of safety measures.

Education and training

• Education and training are understated or ignored in the proposed Strategy. Education should be central to the strategy, with more resources devoted to it. Education is an answer in itself for improving road safety. Significant education and training initiatives are needed — enforcement and engineering initiatives on their own are not enough.
  
  • Education and training initiatives play a fundamental and valuable role in improving road safety. Education and training initiatives are most effective when undertaken in concert with other interventions, when they have the demonstrable ability to enhance the effectiveness of those interventions.
    
    
  • There is a widespread perception that education was, at least, understated and, at most, ignored in the proposed Strategy. Although a range of educational activities was discussed in the proposed Strategy, education was not separately evaluated because its benefits were already attributed to other interventions. Unfortunately, this did not come across clearly to many readers. Decisions based on the proposed Strategy and this consultation process will allow the final Strategy to more clearly outline the directions for education over the next decade.
    
    
  • It should be noted that the performance management framework presented in page 9 of the proposed Strategy document clearly identified education as an important component in the road safety system. This framework is based on government allocating resources to road safety activities in order to achieve specific targets for reductions in injury and death on the road. To reach these targets, a series of interventions (relating to the design and operation of the roading network and the conditions of entry and exit for vehicles and road users) are maintained, introduced or intensified. A range of implementation activities is undertaken to support these interventions.
    
    
  • The interventions comprise a series of standards and rules, and a compliance regime. Education plays an important role in the overall compliance regime applying to the land transport system, along with enforcement, and performance assessment mechanisms (such as an operator performance rating system currently being developed). Education informs participants in the land transport system how to comply with its standards and rules and assists participants' understanding of the reasons for their compliance being desirable.
    
    
• Driver licensing standards need to be greatly improved.
  
  • Changes introduced in May 1999, on the basis of a comprehensive review of the driver licensing system, have greatly strengthened licensing standards. The independent review of the costs and management of driver licensing undertaken during 2000 looked at the licensing standards for young, old and commercial drivers. As a result of this review, the Government has been provided with a package of options designed to improve driver-licensing standards. These options are currently being considered.
    
    
• Drivers should be re-tested every 10 years, or whenever their licence needs to be renewed.
  
  • The issue of periodic re-testing was considered and rejected in the comprehensive review of the driver licensing system. Although there is a popular belief that periodic re-testing will produce safer drivers, overseas experience has not shown this to be so. In reality a crash would rarely be prevented by a driver having up-to-date knowledge of the road rules.
    
    
  • In Norway, a driver re-testing programme was introduced which required drivers to sit a traffic law knowledge test every 10 years. Evaluation of the practice found that drivers merely studied hard for the test and soon forgot what they had learned. The re-testing programme was found to be ineffective and was subsequently discontinued. In the United States of America, although no State routinely requires a driving retest, nine States retest knowledge of highway laws and regulations on licence renewal.
    
    
  • Evaluations of re-testing programmes have failed to show any road safety benefits. The lack of clear road safety benefits makes it difficult to justify the significant costs involved in imposing a driver re-testing regime. It has been argued that drivers may keep up-to-date with road laws and safe driving practices more effectively by frequent exposure to them through greater publicity and education, rather than when forced into a quick learning situation to pass a test.
    
    
• All road safety offenders should re-sit a driving test before regaining their licences.
  
  • There are legal provisions for courts to require less serious traffic offenders to attend a Traffic Improvement School or Defensive Driving Course, or re-sit the driver licensing tests (theory and practical), at the offender's own expense. These orders are made at the discretion of judges. It is generally recognised that compulsory attendance for poorly motivated people is of limited use in bringing about changes in attitudes and driving behaviour.
    
    
  • For the more serious multiple drink-driving offenders who meet strict criteria, courts must order them to attend an alcohol and drug assessment centre (which assumes the inclusion of rehabilitation). Convicted serious traffic offenders who have been disqualified from driving for more than a year must re-sit and pass the theory and practical tests before they are allowed to resume driving.
    
    
• Driver training should involve more practical training. Practical defensive driving courses should be compulsory. Driving skills need to be concentrated on.
  
  • The independent review of the costs and management of driver licensing undertaken during 2000 looked at the issue of driver training requirements, and options are currently being considered by the Government. Historically, driver training has focused on teaching drivers the skills that minimise the consequences of risky situations rather than the skills to avoid risky situations completely. That is, drivers have been taught how to handle the vehicle in emergency situations, such as skids, rather than how to avoid the situation altogether. In contrast research has shown that teaching drivers to avoid risky situations has greater road safety benefits. This approach is reflected in the new driver's licence regime. For example, the test between the restricted and full licensing stages for drivers on the Graduated Driver Licensing System (GDLS) involves testing drivers' cognitive skills, such as their ability to detect hazards in the environment. This test is based on the rationale that drivers who can detect hazards will respond before encountering the hazard, and hence avoid a risky situation. The overall aim of the GDLS is to encourage novice drivers to practise their driving in safe situations.
    
    
• Hazard perception tests being proposed in New South Wales and in the United Kingdom should be considered here.
  
  • Among the package of initiatives introduced in May 1999 to strengthen the GDLS for novice drivers is a new "comprehensive" driving test at the end of the restricted driving period. The new test examines not only a driver's skills, but also the ability to recognise and manage hazards on the road, as well as how to move in traffic streams. Test candidates have to show they are able to detect and respond to driving hazards in built-up areas and higher speed zones; they are asked to describe the major hazards they see and how they should respond as they perform a particular driving manoeuvre. The new older driver test also has a similar requirement for hazard detection.
    
    
  • Evidence of the effectiveness of computerised hazard perception tests is being reviewed as it becomes available, and this type of technology is likely to be considered in the future.
    
    
• All new migrants to New Zealand should be required to sit special NZ licence tests.
  
  • The main objective of licensing overseas drivers is to ensure that they meet the same standards of knowledge of road rules and driving skills as New Zealand drivers, so that they do not place other road users and themselves at risk. Drivers with overseas licences do not generally pose a significant road safety problem in New Zealand and thus introducing stricter testing requirements for migrants cannot be justified.
    
    
  • Currently, all overseas drivers, whether migrants or visitors, who hold either a full, current driver's licence from their home country or an International Driving Permit are allowed to drive on our roads, as private motorists, for up to 12 months after arrival. This situation stems from reciprocal international agreements made under the 1949 and 1968 United Nations Conventions on Road Traffic. This was intended to facilitate the movement of people who may wish to drive when visiting other jurisdictions.
    
    
  • Those overseas drivers who wish to drive in New Zealand for longer than this 12- month period are required to convert to a NZ driver's licence. All overseas licence holders who apply for a New Zealand driver's licence are required to pass a theory test and many are required to pass a practical driving test. Applicants who have held a licence for at least 2 years issued in Australia, Canada, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, the United States of America, or a member state of the European Union are, however, exempt from the practical driving test. This exemption is given in recognition that the driver licensing standards in these countries are generally comparable to those in New Zealand.
    
    
• On-going driver re-education and testing are required. Nationally co-ordinated driver awareness programmes are required, as are national older driver programmes, driver awareness/improvement for adult drivers, awareness programmes for Court-referred drivers, and a linking of driving standards to national qualifications.
  
  • Commercial courses are available for individual or corporate drivers who wish to undertake driver refresher training or specialist training. However, the cost of compulsory driver re-education and testing cannot be justified in terms of the benefits that might result. A number of driver licence-based driver education initiatives are already in progress.
    
    
  • Courses teaching advanced driving skills offer restricted licence holders the opportunity to shorten the minimum period of their licences, although all restricted licence holders are encouraged to complete such a course. The focus of the course is the development of self-awareness as a driver, perception of risk, and skills for self-improvement. One of the two approved courses can also include a qualification on the national qualifications (NZQA) framework. These courses are also approved for driving offenders who are referred by the courts.
    
    
  • Courses to obtain heavy motor vehicle licences and special-type-vehicle endorsements are conducted by industry-based providers approved by the LTSA. All training and assessment is unit-standard based, and successful completion of the courses allows qualifications to be registered on the qualifications framework.
    
    
  • Courses for older drivers have been developed and continue to support driver education for these drivers. The Safe with Age course has been running since 1993 and has recently been updated. The course is designed to be delivered by older drivers for older drivers. Following the introduction of the new older driver test in May 1999, a 'flipchart' presentation on the test was developed to be delivered as a stand-alone course or as an addition to Safe with Age courses.
    
    
• Road safety education should be a compulsory part of the school syllabus. Driver education and training should be taught in secondary schools.
  
  • Road safety education should be a part of the school syllabus. The question is how to achieve this. The current philosophy of the national curriculum in New Zealand does not accommodate the inclusion of road safety as a separate area of study in schools, nor does it allow for mandating it. International evidence suggests that, rather than being taught as a separate subject, road safety is best used as a context for learning in the existing curriculum areas. Recent New Zealand research confirms that this applies here too, and proposals are being developed to implement some or all of the findings.
    
    
• Driver education and training should be taught in secondary schools.
  
  • As already noted, evidence suggests that driver education and training programmes focussing on skill acquisition have little or no effect on novice driver crashes. In some cases this can even lead to increased crash involvement, with novice drivers driving more, and at a younger age, than they would without the training. It also appears that age or maturity has a significant role to play in crashes involving young drivers.
    
    
  • The LTSA and NZ Police are working on programmes to be delivered within the secondary school curriculum that develop sound attitudes towards safety, and encourage a more cautious and reasoned approach to using the roads for young people as they progress towards independent driving. This is based on a promising new approach identified by international researchers.
    
    
• The higher risks faced by young drivers on the roads relate to driver inexperience rather than age. There is no need to raise the minimum driving age to 17 years, as the Graduated Driver Licensing System should ensure that the risks faced by youth are minimised.
  
  • Age-related factors are particularly relevant to New Zealand given that we have the lowest minimum driving age of any developed country. When allowing for differences in distances driven, 15-year-old drivers in New Zealand have the highest risk of being involved in a crash of any age. They are over twice as likely to be involved in a crash as are 17-year-old drivers. Research shows that the over-representation of novice drivers in crashes is due to three interwoven factors: youthfulness; lack of driving experience; and exposure to risk.
    
    
  • It is generally agreed internationally that experience is responsible for the largest proportion of crash reduction during the first years of driving. Recent changes to the Graduated Driver Licensing System in the Driver Licensing Rule specifically target experience as a risk factor.
    
    
  • Age-related factors are also important, with overseas research indicating that, the longer a person can delay getting a licence, the greater the road safety benefits. The option to raise the minimum driving age in New Zealand was estimated in the proposed Strategy as leading to a 2.6% reduction in social cost.
    
    
• The Road Code should be made available on the Internet and free to all New Zealanders.
  
  • The Road Code has been published on a full cost-recovery basis for over 10 years. At the time the current contract for publication of the Road Code was negotiated, electronic publication was not a viable option. When the publication arrangements next come up for renewal in 2003, publication on the Internet may be considered.
    
    
  • Monthly "Code Red" features are aimed at promoting Road Code rules and safety tips that motorists have problems with. Depending on the range of educational resources available, the rules found in the Road Code can be communicated more extensively in order to give road users a greater understanding of how they need to respond to the demands of the roading network.
    
    
• Current and past drink-driving advertisements should be evaluated for their effectiveness as a deterrent, and a comparison of the effectiveness of the different types of advertisements completed.
  
  • It is important to evaluate the strategic advertising campaign for effectiveness and this is done regularly.
    
    
  • The LTSA advertising campaign that supports NZ Police enforcement has been evaluated and has been found to be very successful in all areas — not just for drink driving. The combined programme (the Supplementary Road Safety Package) was independently reviewed in 1998, and the reviewers concluded that the programme had been effective in preventing 109 deaths and 1029 serious injuries within its first two years. A four-yearly review is under way and will be completed in December 2001.
    
    
  • The advertising campaign is constantly being evaluated for its effectiveness. One of the outcome measures is drink-driving numbers — taken from both regular driver-alcohol surveys and the number of drink drivers killed. The effectiveness of different types of alcohol advertisements produced over the last 5 years has been compared as part of a continuous improvement process to reach target groups more effectively.
    
    
• Funding criteria for NZ Road Safety Programme community safety promotions and projects based on proven or promising projects should be established. This would better target resources and promote best practice. To assist this a review of community projects is recommended that provides an evaluation of what is effective and why.
  
  • Current practice is to make previous evaluations of community projects available to Road Safety Co-ordinators, to help them to determine what is best practice with regard to different types of projects in different areas. As with community programmes in other countries, these evaluations are "process" oriented or related to the impact on perceptions or the amount of media coverage.
    
    
  • While the community programme is built into New Zealand's best-practice framework, it is extremely difficult to scientifically determine the effect of the programme on road safety outcomes because of the compounding effects of other, larger, programmes such as engineering and enforcement. All projects are instead rigorously screened against best-practice criteria, and evaluated annually.
    
    
  • A comprehensive review of the LTSA's Community Road Safety Programme is scheduled for the first few years of the life of the Strategy, to ensure that its results match with the principles developed for the programme and to establish whether and/or how it could be strengthened.
    
    

General enforcement issues

• Enforcement tends to target the average driver rather than dangerous and poor drivers who are really taking risks. Management of driver behaviour should concentrate on reducing the incidence of significant variations outside the standards set, rather than seeking to achieve a reduction in the average.
  
  • Enforcement is conducted across the board as well as targeted towards high-risk groups of drivers, such as recidivists. Using the example of speeding, drivers who exceed the speed limit are operating outside the standards set for that particular roading environment, and are posing an unacceptable level of risk within that environment. Targeting all speeding drivers at a specific tolerance level is designed to reduce the fastest speeds, and speeds overall.
    
    
  • The aim of strategic enforcement of key behaviours is to achieve a general deterrence effect, by increasing the public perception of the risk of being caught. This is a well-established policing strategy that has proved successful in targeting high-risk behaviours such as drink driving.
    
    
• Greater penalties are needed for offenders, especially drink drivers.
  
  • Police now have the power to immediately suspend for 28 days the drivers' licences of grossly intoxicated drivers, and of those who are caught driving at grossly excessive speeds. Police also now have the power to immediately impound for 28 days vehicles driven by drivers who are disqualified, or whose licences are suspended, or who have otherwise been ordered to stop driving. More severe penalties for third or subsequent drink-drive offences are also available to the Courts.
    
    
  • The impacts of these interventions need to be assessed before deciding what further changes (if any) to the penalty regime need to be considered. However, there was a 28% reduction in reported driving-while-disqualified offences in the first 12 months of the new vehicle impoundment measure. Although this regime targets disqualified and unlicensed drivers, it has the potential to affect drink-drivers as, if convicted, they are subject to a mandatory minimum licence disqualification of six months.
    
    
• There is currently a lack of determined and visible enforcement. Current laws should be meaningfully enforced first, before new ones are introduced.
  
  • There has been a substantial reduction in New Zealand's road toll over the last decade, despite persistent traffic growth that has increased exposure to risk. In 1990, 730 New Zealanders were killed and over 4000 serious injured. In 2000, there were 461 deaths and just over 2400 serious injuries. This was due to a variety of factors, including significant improvements in traffic enforcement. An example of this is the Supplementary Road Safety Package referred to above, which combined greater enforcement with a new advertising programme and was considered by independent evaluators to have been effective in preventing 109 deaths and 1029 serious injuries within its first two years.
    
    
  • The NZ Police are currently preparing an internal Road Safety Strategy to 2003, to guide their road safety and enforcement activities. A specialised road traffic service will be dedicated to further improving road safety enforcement and education, and will aim to be firm, fair, courageous and consistent. The NZ Police aim to achieve a heightened public perception that they are serious about road safety. The recently-introduced state highway patrol and dedicated traffic safety enforcement teams are evidence of this.
    
    

Modes of transport other than provate motor vehicles

• A greater emphasis on cycle safety, pedestrian safety, and passenger transport is required. The strategy should support initiatives to reduce traffic, to make energy-efficient modes of travel (such as walking, cycling and passenger transport) more viable, and to promote healthy lifestyles through physical activity within the roading environment. Cyclist and pedestrian rights and needs must be protected, with more research into, and development of best practice for, these vulnerable road users.
  
  • A simple right of access to the roading network exists for cyclists and pedestrians and the land transport system needs to accommodate these users more safely. These vulnerable road users should not face safety disadvantages because of their choice of transport mode. It is intended that the final Strategy will have specific safety targets for cyclists and pedestrians, and issues of safe access for these groups will be further explored.
    
    
  • The Government is currently reviewing road management, funding and promotion guidelines and mechanisms, which are relevant to cyclists and pedestrians. This work will support broader initiatives to promote these modes and the use of public transport (which is also reliant on safe walking environments). If wider government strategies place more emphasis on increasing walking, cycling or the use of public transport, then even greater safety attention will be required for vulnerable users.
    
    
  • Passenger transport is a particularly safe mode of travel, but there is no evidence of initiatives that demonstrate increased use as a cost-effective safety intervention. However, significant reductions in motor vehicle traffic would clearly impact positively on safety outcomes. If robust, measurable initiatives to reduce traffic and/or increase use of passenger transport are implemented within a broader transport or energy-efficiency strategic framework, a ten-year road safety strategy would need to be amended to take account of a significant change in transport use. Three-yearly reviews of the Strategy are proposed to allow such changes in transport use to be taken into account and amendments to be made to the Strategy.
    
    
• Cycling should be promoted for its health benefits, which outweigh any safety disadvantages.
  
  • While cycling and walking provide good forms of physical activity, and there are health benefits to be gained from undertaking either activity, it is unknown whether, or in what circumstances, the health benefits of cycling outweigh the risks of injury to cyclists. A British Medical Association report is claimed by many commentators to indicate that the 'years added' to a regular cyclist's life through cycling outweigh the statistical 'years lost' by any increased crash risk of cycling compared with motorised transport, by a factor of 20:1. The indicative analysis carried out actually refers to regular exercise rather than regular cycling. Leaving aside other difficulties in the analysis, which are fully acknowledged by the authors, this means that (notwithstanding the obvious health benefits of cycling), the health benefits have been exaggerated as most people, including cyclists, gain their exercise from a variety of physical activities. As the British Medical Association report notes "…whilst the fatality-rate for cyclists per kilometre travelled is over eleven times the rate for motorists, compared with cycling, car travel is more deleterious to health unless the motorist is able to exercise several times a week by other means that will maintain fitness."
    
  • There are many interventions that can be undertaken to reduce the safety disadvantages of cycling. The proposed Strategy document has outlined some of the measures that can improve safety for cyclists.
    
    
  • Strategies to improve transport safety cannot be undertaken in isolation from wider society. It is important that a safety strategy complement, and not run counter to, other relevant government strategies, such as the government's health strategy. While the proposed Strategy will not directly address the promotion of healthy exercise in its own right, providing safe access for all road users to the road network will remain a significant concern for the final Strategy.
    
    
• Awareness of vulnerable road users (such as cyclists and pedestrians) needs to be promoted through the Road Code and other publications, making greater use of cyclist or pedestrian interaction examples. The Australian "Share the Road" campaign should be used in NZ.
  
  • The new edition of the Road Code features increased coverage of cyclists as part of the general traffic mix, including in situations depicting traffic interactions. Further inclusion of cyclists and pedestrians may occur as various parts of the Road Code are progressively reviewed and updated.
    
    
  • The education of drivers with respect to sharing the road with cyclists and pedestrians (and vice versa) is important. Funding is available through the Community Road Safety Programme for local communities to run such programmes in their area, and each year a number of communities do so. The LTSA also runs monthly features aimed at promoting Road Code rules and safety tips that motorists have problems with. The Code Red feature for last June promoted the message that motorists be alert for cyclists on the road and that they drive carefully when near them. The feature contained guidelines for sharing the road safely with cyclists. Further promotional activity will be considered in the context of an integrated package of initiatives addressing vulnerable road users.
    
    

Equity issues

• Targeting extra safety spending to cost density or risk can lead to the perception of inequity. Not all road users will get the full value of the extra money spent on road safety as proposed in the Strategy. Targeting to high cost density or risk will mean low-risk areas will miss out, or even have their current funding decreased. Specific interventions that do not meet cost-density prioritisation criteria may need to be developed for socio-economic areas with low/small rating bases.
  
  • Analytical tools have been developed to target road safety resources to where they will maximise efficiency, equity, or any chosen combination of the two. This is achieved by targeting road safety resources according to cost density and to risk. Areas with high social cost density may receive more funding as a result of the proposed Strategy. This is because it is efficient to do so. Roads with a high risk should be targeted for a different reason — that of fairness or equity.
    
    
  • It is undesirable for some parts of the network to be much riskier than others. These concerns need to be addressed and more analysis is required, particularly in the context of the New Zealand Transport Strategy that has been proposed for development.
    
    

Roading management|funding issues

• There is a lack of accountability or incentives for road controlling authorities (RCAs) to develop safety improvements.
  
  • Accountability is an issue that is addressed under the Transit New Zealand Act (1989). Transfund's mandate under the Act is to allocate resources (to RCAs) to achieve a safe and efficient roading system. Transit NZ has a responsibility under the Act to provide a safe and efficient state highway network, but this responsibility is not explicit for other RCAs. Safety Management Systems are considered to be a means of making road-controlling authorities more accountable for the safety of those parts of the roading network for which they are responsible. In turn this will lead to clearer accountability for other outcomes.
    
    
• A lack of funding currently available to RCAs from local authority rates can restrict the projects undertaken. If matching contributions are required from RCAs to fund the proposed Strategy's increased engineering, roading improvements are likely to be restricted to State Highways.
  
  • The proposed Strategy provided estimates of additional funding needed by National Roads Fund sources only. An increase in the rating contribution to fund further safety improvements to the network was not considered. The proposed engineering expenditure was additional to the projected investment via the National Roads Fund and local authority rates over the next ten years. The Government is currently considering the broader role of rates contributions to roading. This exercise will affect the funding contributions that local authorities may need to make as part of the final Strategy.
    
    
• Management of road safety initiatives should be the responsibility of road controlling authorities (RCAs), with support provided by the NZ Police and the LTSA. Safety Management Systems (SMS) should form the basis of a bulk-funded approach to safety works. RCAs should be accountable for pedestrian, cyclist and child-injury outcomes, and be involved in the monitoring and reporting of vulnerable road-user injury rates.
  
  • Road-controlling authorities should be responsible for the implementation of cost- effective road based safety measures. The safety management system approach is an essential element of the proposed 2010 Strategy. A framework safety management system will be specified in a Land Transport Rule, a form of legislation developed by the Government in partnership with road safety stakeholders (including road controlling authorities) and the wider public. Individual safety management systems will be negotiated between the LTSA and each road-controlling authority. It is envisaged that a safety management system approach will require road controlling authorities to comprehensively address how they will implement their contributions to the achievement of the 2010 Strategy's targets. The safety management system will specify the process by which road-controlling authorities manage risk on their roads and will facilitate road-controlling authorities' implementing cost-effective road-based countermeasures to achieve safety outcomes for all types of road user.
    
    
• The current BC ratio system needs to be modified to make funds available for strategic routes. It does not take account of preventive safety measures, but is instead reactive and based on the number of fatalities (and serious crashes) on a given piece of road. A bias towards safety is required to prevent the dilution of safety benefits. Funding for blackspots through the current BC system is also being withheld because of insufficient crashes. 'Greyspots' (2 or more crashes) should receive funding.
  
  • The evaluation procedures provided by Transfund to determine project safety benefits are currently under review. The aim of the review is to provide a more pro-active approach to safety analysis, which combines the information determined from historic accident records with forecasts of possible future accidents using sophisticated statistical analysis.
    
    
  • The current cost/benefit analysis procedures enable the prioritising of road projects in order to obtain the greatest returns from the funds invested. The current evaluation procedures do allocate resources to safety projects, such as the treatment of blackspots and other specific safety improvements. The current procedures also generate new construction projects where a substantial proportion of all the benefits is safety related.
    
    
  • A greater focus on safety engineering is required to support the implementation of the final Strategy. Safety management systems will be a critical element of this. Improved analytical tools will also be required to better integrate safety into the design and operation of the network.
    
    
  • The issue of funding needs to be considered within the wider land transport policy proposals. In any system there will need to be some form of prioritising of expenditure to make sure that the most urgent needs are met first. This is being addressed within the Government's wider land transport policy project.
    
    
• There is an identified shortfall of roading engineers in NZ
  
  • This is a concern, and work is being undertaken with educational institutions on the availability and content of courses.
    
    
• RCAs do not have a final say on the positioning of poles and plant to ensure 'soft' road edges free from obstructions (phone, gas and electricity companies are able to position these themselves). This legislation needs to be reviewed in relation to road safety.
  
  • Further work is required in this area as there is widespread concern about the placement of any object in the roadside area that may be hazardous to vehicles which leave the roadway. Statistics show that collisions with utility poles are a significant crash problem. Removal or relocation of these poles could provide considerable crash savings.
    
    
  • While many road-controlling authorities have programmes in place to treat these hazards, progress is currently being hampered by a number of legal and institutional issues, including the utilities' desire to avoid 'aerial trespass', which has led in recent years to the locating of poles further from property boundaries and closer to the road. These issues have been, and will continue to be, compounded by the growth in the number of utility companies. There are currently conflicting statutory requirements applying to roading authorities and utilities that will probably require reconsideration before this problem is resolved.
    
    

Funding issues

• Money collected from petrol excise, RUC and vehicle licensing fees is misappropriated to the Crown Account, instead of being used for roading purposes. This money should be used to fund the Strategy. This will not mean taking money from other areas, as an increase in road safety spending will reduce the demand for health and ACC spending.
  
  • The Government will be considering this issue as part of its review of land transport policy this year. Re-directing money to road safety which is currently being used in from the Crown Account would necessitate increasing taxes from other sources, as funding of any shortfall would be required.
    
    
  • An increase in road safety spending is expected to provide significant savings to both ACC and the health sector as the number of injuries will decrease. These savings may be nullified by rising health costs, but the overall effect will be to at least keep these costs in check.
    
    
• No extra funding for the Strategy is needed. The Strategy can be funded by the reduction in social costs expected from a lower road toll.
  
  • The term "social cost" as used in the road safety context is different from financial cost, and is a measure used for economic analyses of the crash and injury costs that result from motor vehicle crashes. The social costs of a road crash include: loss of life and life quality, pain, grief and suffering, loss of output due to temporary incapacitation, medical costs, legal costs and property damage costs. Of these components, the economic costs of loss of life and life quality are the largest. Achieving a reduction in social costs does not mean that we can achieve an equivalent saving in financial terms, because these are two different types of measure.
    
    
• Strategy funding should be "rin-fenced" and directed only to safety initiatives. Any new funds collected must be used in this way.
  
  • Any new road safety funding for the Strategy will need to be allocated in such a way that it maximises the safety returns in terms of the social cost reductions expected to be achieved. Additional safety funding does need to be transparent, and agencies held to account for maximising the effectiveness of that safety funding. This requires further work when preparing the final Strategy.
    
    
• Fines and penalties collected from enforcement initiatives should not go to the Crown Account but be allocated to road safety initiatives.
  
  • The funding of road safety initiatives is deliberately kept separate from the use of fine revenues. This ensures that they are justified by their safety outcomes alone, and not by revenue-gathering motivations. A change in arrangements to use fine revenues to fund safety initiatives would invite the view that incentives were being created to collect revenue, over and above the levels justified by any safety gains to be achieved.
    
    
  • Fines are imposed in accordance with the principles of retributive justice which seek payment for a wrong done. Fines are not imposed in order to benefit even a good cause.
    
    

Targets

• There should be targets for many types of outputs and outcomes, such as: 'loss-of-control' crashes (since these seem to be a major cause of crashes); educational activity outputs; drug-use related crashes; young driver crashes; road user behaviour and driving standards; all age groups; child injuries; fatigue-related crashes; and crashes on different road types (e.g. rural people on rural roads).
  
  • Targets are proposed to ensure that there is a clear focus on reducing road trauma across the network, and to make various organisations more accountable for reaching those targets. The outcome targets proposed were, or can be, analytically derived. They focused on final injury outcomes, intermediate outcomes that would play a critical role in reaching those final outcomes, and outputs that would form a work programme to achieve both final and intermediate outcomes.
    
    
  • Within the life of the proposed Strategy, one of the key strategic developments is intended to be that greater accountability for the safety performance of the roading network is placed on roading authorities. Although road-controlling authorities do not have complete control over many aspects of safety on their networks (such as entry and exit of vehicles and road users to and from the roading network) they are responsible for the safety of the roading environment. In this context, there is a good argument for focusing final national outcome targets on specific road-user types, such as cyclists and pedestrians, which are particularly vulnerable. Composite serious injury and fatality targets will be set at a regional level.
    
    
  • Final outcome targets are not proposed for different demographic categories of road user, such as younger or older drivers or Maori and Pacific peoples. This was an issue that was discussed in the hui and fono, where the view was that such targets were not appropriate. Rather, it is proposed that different demographic categories of road user be prioritised within the final Strategy, and that programmes be enhanced or developed in order to improve their safety.
    
    
• Targets in the Strategy should not only be set for road safety outcomes, but also for increases in other modes of transport: there should be targets for increases in the proportion of children cycling and walking to school; increases in cyclist and pedestrian activity; and increases in public transport use.
  
  • Specific safety targets are proposed for cyclists and pedestrians. Improving the capacity of the roading network to safely accommodate cyclists and pedestrians should support their increased use of the network. Three-yearly reviews of the Strategy are proposed to allow any changes in transport use to be taken into account and amendments to be made to the Strategy.
    
    
• Vulnerable road user targets should be exposure based (retention of mobility is important).
  
  • Currently the only national estimates of exposure for cyclists and pedestrians are from household travel surveys. These were carried out in 1989/90 and 1997/98, and consideration is being given to the possibility of conducting more regular and more frequent travel surveys to support exposure based targets for these road users.
    
    
• Targets should be negotiated with each RCA.
  
  • Final outcome targets are proposed down to a local government region level. Because of the difficulties in validating such targets, these would be set as a composite fatality and serious injury target. As final outcome targets cannot be disaggregated to a level that allows statistically-valid targets to be set across 74 local roading authorities, outcome targets will not be set for each road-controlling authority. However, it is intended that monitoring of safety performance at a road-controlling authority level will be continued, and this information could be provided to assess the contribution that is being made to targets at a regional level.
    
    
• Social costs should be the secondary level of target type. Social cost merely follows trends in fatality and injury rates. Social cost changes can come from changes in the value of statistical life.
  
  • Social cost is a measure of the pain and suffering incurred by road trauma, and all social cost estimates in the proposed Strategy were based on the current value of statistical life, at June 1999 prices. The three-yearly reviews of the Strategy will allow any changes to the social cost of accidents to be incorporated into the social cost targets and the overall target to be amended as necessary.
    
    
  • The expected reductions in the number of deaths over the period of the proposed Strategy will not be of the same proportion as the expected reductions in the number of injuries. Expressing the overall target in social-cost terms gives an indication of how the total social cost of road trauma will change if the targets are achieved.
    
    

Network interventions|issues

• More passing lanes and wider, straighter roads will only encourage speeding, and may reduce safety for pedestrians and cyclists.
  
  • More passing lanes and wider, straighter roads (in both rural and urban areas) will in effect increase the design speed of these roads. Enforcement of the speed limit will still be required, along with the education of road users so that they are aware of the appropriate speeds.
    
    
  • Road upgrades would need to be accompanied by measures to reduce the risk to pedestrians. Similarly, road upgrades would need to provide safer facilities for cyclists.
    
    
• National standards for roads are needed. Special care for the needs of pedestrians and cyclists is required when adopting such standards. A Standardisation Board needs to be formed to have an overview of the whole country and ensure road-controlling authorities adhere to a set of standard road markings and signage throughout New Zealand.
  
  • The Traffic Regulations already set national standards for signs, traffic signals, road markings and traffic islands. It is proposed that the specifications in the Regulations be replaced with a Traffic Control Devices Rule which will be simpler, more comprehensive and more user friendly. The Rule, currently under development, will also provide guidance to road controlling authorities on how traffic control devices (e.g. signs, road markings, traffic signals, traffic islands) are to be used. It is proposed that many specifications and standards that are currently voluntary will have the force of law. The development of this Rule will involve public consultation, to ensure that the views of all road users, including vulnerable road users, are considered.
    
    
  • In addition Transfund's Standards and Guidelines Manual prescribes a wide range of road design and construction standards, including those for cycle and pedestrian facilities. Although Transfund's manual does not have the force of law, roading projects or activities which receive a Transfund subsidy are generally required to comply with it. The manual is regularly reviewed and this should enable changes in best practice for these groups to be incorporated.
    
    
  • Greater consistency in the levels of service on comparable roads between different road controlling authorities is needed. In order to achieve this an agreed functional road hierarchy for the entire network is needed, for which such standards can be set taking into account the needs of all road users. This is being progressed as part of the Safety Management Systems approach to managing our roads.
    
    
• Both urban and open-road speed limits should be raised.
  
  • Research studies show that, all other things being equal, increasing the speed limit leads to increases in crash and injury rates when the speed limit change is accompanied by a mean speed increase. Higher speeds also result in more severe injuries. Similarly, decreasing a speed limit can reduce crash and injury rates when the speed limit change is accompanied by a mean speed decrease. The primary safety task is to manage a decrease in mean speeds. Speed limits are one management tool, but need to be considered alongside engineering and enforcement mechanisms.
    
    
  • Speed limits should relate to the design speed of the road and, if there are design limitations, it will mean that higher speed limits are not safe. In comparing New Zealand's 100 km/h roads with the design standards overseas jurisdictions specify for higher speed roads, New Zealand does not measure up well. The characteristics of our open roads suggest that, if the speed limits were set purely on the basis of road features, they would be less than 100 km/h. Examples of the features in question are steep roadside ditches, the consistent minimum provision of shoulders, shoulder sealing, and roadside clear zones.
    
    
  • Urban roads are generally not capable of supporting a speed limit of 60 km/h without a substantial increase in road trauma. However, it is possible under existing policy for road controlling authorities to raise the speed limit on an urban road provided that the road meets certain minimum standards.
    
    
• The Urban Speed limit should be lowered to 30 km/h or 40 km/h to halve the risk to vulnerable road users. School safety zones of 40 km/h are required. More variation in urban speed limits is required.
  
  • Under existing policy, it is possible for a road controlling authority to set any appropriate speed limit in an appropriate urban area (such as shopping centres), provided that the road and its surroundings meet the minimum standards required set out in Speed Limits NZ. For example, to qualify for a limit of less than 50 km/h, an urban street must have engineering features, such as speed humps, chicanes or other traffic-calming measures, which will actively reduce speeds.
    
    
  • In determining an appropriate speed limit for a given road, the interests of safety and mobility need to be balanced. Although a speed limit of 30 or 40 km/h would certainly provide greater safety, most people may not voluntarily comply with it, nor view it as reasonable, and the level of enforcement required to enforce the limit would be high. Most people would only be inclined to comply with such a limit in appropriate contexts and on limited stretches of road.
    
    
  • School 40 km/h zones, with variable speed limit signs, are currently being trialled in Christchurch.
    
    
• Separate speed limits are needed for each motorway lane, with trucks not allowed in fast lanes and minimum speed limits enforced.
  
  • Regulations do currently provide for minimum speed lanes. Generally overseas, minimum speed lanes are only used on multi-lane motorways (of 3 or more lanes). Trucks still need to be able to pass slower traffic, making 2-lane motorways unsuitable for a minimum speed lane. Minimum speed lanes have not been considered for New Zealand motorways, because we have a relatively small motorway network and already have two other enforceable safety rules which render it unnecessary (i.e. the "keep left" rule and the rule that vehicles should not unreasonably impede other traffic).
    
    
• Consistency of speed limits is required, as well as more opportunity to graduate speed limits along roads. Open-road 90 km/h speed limits should only be put in place in dangerous areas, or temporarily until engineering improvements make 100 km/h a safe design speed.
  
  • Graduating speed limits along roads is currently possible, and road-controlling authorities can choose to do so.
    
    
  • Greater consistency of speed limits across different road types could be better achieved by lowering the open-road speed limits on those roads which do not currently meet 100 km/h design standards. For instance, many minor rural roads are not of the same design standard as state highways, and their speed limits could be lower to compensate for this. It is currently possible for road controlling authorities to lower speeds for such roads.
    
    
  • There are also opportunities to undertake engineering improvements to achieve greater consistency, and there are always trade-offs between time savings (for example) and safety.
    
    
  • A Setting of Speed Limits Rule is currently being developed. The purpose of the Rule is to transfer the responsibility and administration for setting speed limits to road controlling authorities. An algorithm known as 'Speed Limits New Zealand' (SLNZ) provides a systematic method for calculating the safe and appropriate speed limit, and is included in the Rule to ensure the speed-limit policy is applied safely and uniformly throughout the country. In some rare situations, SLNZ may not produce a sound result due to special features or activities on a length of road. In these circumstances the rule will allow for a variation from SLNZ, based on speed-limit policy and sound engineering judgement, to determine the appropriate and safe speed limit for the road. Road controlling authorities will be required to consult with all those affected by a proposed speed limit, and to advise the Director of Land Transport Safety of any speed limit proposal that varies from the limit calculated using SLNZ.
    
    
  • Lower speed limits should be allowed on dangerous roads as a possible safety counter-measure.
    
    
• The major problem on our roads is slow drivers who do not let others pass, or just hold up traffic. This causes frustration and increases the likelihood of someone having to pass in a dangerous place.
  
  • In New Zealand, overtaking and lane-change crashes represent 6% of all fatal crashes and 4% of injury crashes, and more passing lanes could be provided where they could be justified.
    
    
  • There are safety benefits in reducing variations in traffic speeds, but the benefits are not as great as those from reducing mean traffic speeds. Encouraging all speeding drivers to slow down would have greater overall safety benefits than targeting the speeds of slower drivers as they comprise the core safety problem. Encouraging slower drivers to speed up would increase their crash risk, because they are often driving more slowly due their own of driver or vehicle inadequacies. This would also result in more severe injuries for these drivers if they subsequently became involved in a crash.
    
    
  • Slow drivers can cause frustration to faster drivers, either at the point of being caught behind a slower driver or when trying to make up lost time. Passing lanes will continue to be considered, along with encouraging slow drivers to pull over at safe locations and to keep well to the left.
    
    
• More and better road signs and markings are required.
  
  • There is room for improvement in this area. This issue will continue to be looked at, as well as the potential use of new technology to aid road signs. Signs should be used where appropriate and needed. Signs cannot be used to point out everything on the roads, as to do so would create a confusing road environment for drivers.
    
    
  • As mentioned above, the Traffic Regulations set national standards for signs, traffic signals, road markings and traffic islands. The specifications in the Regulations are to be replaced with a Traffic Control Devices Rule which will be simpler, more comprehensive and more user friendly. The Rule, currently under development, will also provide guidance to road controlling authorities on how traffic control devices (e.g. signs, road markings, traffic signals, and traffic islands) are to be used. The Rule will ensure that many specifications and standards which are currently voluntary will have the force of law.
    
    

Drink-driving interventions

• A recent methodologically-rigorous time-series analysis carried out in Australia recommended a ratio of one Compulsory Breath Test (CBT) per licensed driver. New Zealand's current ratio is 0.73 and thus falls short of the recommended best practice. New Zealand's CBT operations should be further increased.
  
  • One of the proposed interventions in the Strategy is increased compulsory breath testing. This would mean increased police resources devoted to CBT and the breath testing of more drivers. The Strategy's proposal is based on what could be achieved in NZ by conducting CBT operations in a similar manner to those in Victoria and New South Wales, both in terms of the methods used and the volumes of CBT operations undertaken.
    
    
• The BAC limit should be zero for all drivers.
  
  • There are technical difficulties associated with measuring very small amounts of alcohol in a person's breath and enforcing an absolute zero limit. Nevertheless the proposed Strategy 2010 recommends an absolute zero limit for young drivers, as is the case in Australia. This reflects the greater alcohol-related risk faced by young drivers, and sends the message that no alcohol consumption before driving is acceptable. Under such a regime, there would be a zero limit in law but the Police would enforce it at about 30 mg alcohol/100 ml blood.
    
    
• Drivers between 50-80 mg/100 ml are not causing the crashes and it is unfair to penalise them. Lowering the BAC limit would not result in a significant social cost reduction, and the Strategy's estimate is too high. Only excessive BAC limits should be targeted.
  
  • New Zealand's current legal alcohol limit is based on conclusive studies linking alcohol with impaired driving ability and an increased risk of crashing. These studies indicate that, for injury and fatal crashes for the population as a whole, the risk of crashing associated with driving after drinking begins to rise appreciably in the 50 mg to 80 mg/100 ml range, with a serious steepening noticeable at about 80 mg/100 ml.
    
    
  • Since these limits were introduced, re-analysis of previous research and more sophisticated laboratory studies have reinforced the finding that many drivers are impaired at alcohol levels below 80 mg/100 ml. Findings indicate that drivers with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 50 mg/100 ml are 1.5 times as likely to crash as sober drivers. The renowned 'Grand Rapids' study and subsequent statistical analysis indicate that the risk of being involved in an injury crash among drivers who have a blood alcohol level of 50 mg/100 ml is about 1.5 times that at zero, and at 80 mg/100 ml it is about 2.5 times that at zero. The risk of being involved in a fatal crash is many times higher — about 4 times at 80 mg/100 ml and about 30 times at 150 mg/100 ml.
    
    
  • The presence of alcohol is also harmful if a person is injured in a crash. It exacerbates the injuries received in crashes, slows recovery, and reduces a person's chance of surviving.
    
    
  • The combination of the increased risk of crashing, even at lower levels of alcohol consumption, and the impact of alcohol on injuries sustained, suggests there are clear benefits in reducing the legal alcohol limit to 50 mg/100 ml.
    
    
  • International experience also supports the reduction to a 50 mg/100 ml alcohol limit. In Australia, the number of drivers detected with excess blood alcohol levels has declined, as have alcohol-related crashes, since the introduction of a 50 mg/100 ml legal alcohol limit. These have occurred not just at the lower levels of alcohol consumption, but also at levels above 80 mg/100 ml.
    
    
  • Lowering the legal alcohol limit is expected to have a considerable general deterrent effect, and also to impact on persistent offenders.
    
    
  • Opponents of a 50 mg/100 ml limit argue that there are few reported crashes in which the driver's BAC is in the 50-80mg/100 ml range (approximately 4 drivers are killed each year with levels in this range), and that such drivers do not pose an undue road safety risk. Claims have been made that most drink drivers involved in fatal crashes are 'hardcore' drink drivers, with either a previous drink-drive conviction or an exceptionally high BAC of over 150 mg/100 ml. Although this group constitutes a minority, it has been argued that Police efforts should focus on this group of drivers which is the 'real problem', and not be wasted on the bulk of drivers who are responsible and moderate drinkers.
    
    
  • This argument does not take into account international experience, which shows that the deterrent effect impacts across the board, not only on drink driving in the 50-80 mg/100 ml range. For example, if NZ was to experience the same effect as NSW from the combination of CBT and a lower alcohol limit, we could expect a further reduction of approximately 40% in the number of drunk drivers killed in NZ with blood alcohol levels in excess of 150 mg/100 ml.
    
    
  • Opponents of a lower legal limit have argued that any possible benefits of a 50 mg/100 ml limit could be achieved more effectively and fairly by other strategies, such as more intensive compulsory breath testing, stricter enforcement, tougher penalties, and on-going publicity and education. Each of these strategies was modelled in the development of the proposed Strategy. While the current campaigns, which incorporate most of these strategies, have gone some way towards reducing the number of people killed by drink driving, international experience indicates that greater additional road safety benefits can be accrued through the introduction of a lower legal alcohol limit of 50 mg/100 ml.
    
    
• The Australian method should be used, whereby 50-80 mg/100 ml offenders receive only a fine and a 12-month grace period.
  
  • If NZ was to introduce a lower alcohol limit, some consideration would need to be given to changes to the penalty regime. In particular, there is the issue of what penalties should apply to drivers who offend at the lower BAC levels of between 50 mg and 80 mg/100 ml. In most Australian jurisdictions, fines, demerit points, and the length of licence disqualification are generally graduated according to the level of intoxication and on the basis of first, second, or subsequent offences; more severe penalties are applied to repeat offences.
    
    

Other interventions/issues

• Red Light Cameras should be an intervention in the Strategy.
  
  • Crashes at intersections make up a significant proportion of urban road crashes, and red-light running is one of the causes of these intersection crashes. Red-light cameras are often proposed as a solution to the difficulty and expense of enforcing road safety at signalised intersections. However, there is currently no conclusive evidence that red-light cameras in their own right improve safety at signalised intersections, and there is some evidence that there may be safety risks if red light cameras are installed in certain conditions. It is important to recognise that red-light cameras are only one part of a complex system of interaction between drivers, intersections, traffic signals and the cameras. Work is under way to improve knowledge and expertise on how to get the best use of red-light cameras to improve intersection safety.
    
    
• Fatigue is a problem that needs to be combated. Better data are required for driver fatigue crashes. There needs to be better recording of the time and type of fatigue-related crashes.
  
  • Fatigue is a significant problem. Between 1997 and 1999 driver fatigue was identified as a contributing factor in 130 fatal crashes and 1,317 injury crashes. This represents approximately ten percent of fatal crashes and five percent of injury crashes annually. The actual prevalence of fatigue is likely to be higher than reported figures because driver fatigue is difficult to identify or recognise as contributing to a crash through traffic crash reports. It is also rare for drivers involved in a crash to voluntarily admit that they were fatigued.
    
    
  • Driver fatigue is commonly thought of as falling asleep at the wheel. However, sleep is the extreme stage of fatigue. Driving can be impaired by fatigue well before the point of falling asleep. Fatigued individuals have slower reaction times, which endangers them when they encounter unusual, unexpected or emergency situations. Other signs and symptoms of fatigue include being fixated, reduced vigilance and lethargy. Fatigue generally results from loss of sleep and the influence of the body's circadian rhythms (cycles of the in-built body clock that programmes us to be sleepy at certain times).
    
    
  • Since fatigue-related crashes which are reported often involve alcohol or speed, a large proportion of these crashes can be reduced by targeting drink driving and speeding. There are some gains to be made from initiatives that address fatigue specifically. Commercial drivers are by law restricted in the hours they drive and the minimum breaks they must take. A review of the driving hours regulations is currently under way, and initiatives such as alertness management training and alternative compliance through the use of strictly-supervised fatigue management programmes are being investigated (a fatigue management programme trial will be undertaken in 2001). In particular, the LTSA is proposing to increase minimum rest hours, and to introduce chain-of-responsibility provisions — making people involved in the transport chain more accountable for ensuring drivers comply with driving hours requirements. Intelligent transport systems may also assist in this area in the future, with devices being developed such as electronic logbooks to reduce the falsification of driving hours recorded, and those that alert drivers if they exhibit signs of fatigue.
    
    
  • Education tends to be the main initiative for managing fatigue amongst the general driving population and may be undertaken at the national or community level. The distribution of fact sheets on fatigue, combined with community initiatives such as the 'take a break' campaign delivered during public holiday periods, serves to increase public awareness of the dangers of driving while fatigued.
    
    
• Safety at roadworks sites is an issue. Better enforcement, especially of speed limits, is required.
  
  • This is an issue that needs to be addressed. The problem is not only one of enforcement of speed limits at roadworks sites. Signs and methods of ensuring drivers are aware of dangerous areas around these sites need to be considered. Much work is currently under way, with the LTSA, Transfund NZ, Transit NZ and consultants and contractors considering this issue. Solutions are being sought for more consistency of signs and site design and better enforcement at roadworks sites.
    
    
• Heavy vehicle speed limits need to be enforced.
  
  • Greater enforcement is required of heavy vehicle speed limits to ensure all heavy vehicles are travelling at no more than 90 km/h. The recent introduction of dedicated highway patrols should mean there will be more enforcement of these speed limits. There may be further potential improvements in speed management technology.
    
    
  • The draft Vehicle Dimension and Mass Rule proposes new stability and performance requirements for heavy vehicles. The aim of the rule is to ensure all trucks meet a minimum level of safe handling at open road speeds. Once the Rule is in place, rationalising the 80 and 90 km/h heavy-vehicle speed limits can be considered to assist with more rigid and effective enforcement.
    
    
• Speed limiters should be required on all new cars.
  
  • Speed limiters will be kept under review because they address a behavioural problem within a technological context. Technology may improve to the extent that these could become a viable option. However, speed limiters would be easy to bypass in a modern vehicle. Imposing speed limiters on only new vehicles could encourage people to purchase "hot rod" style used vehicles, which would be less safe than standard new models. There could also be safety concerns (relating to overtaking manoeuvres) in doing so. No other country in the world has imposed speed limiters (close to the speed limit) for light vehicles.
    
    
• There are too many unwarranted and unregistered vehicles on the road. Better enforcement of these is required.
  
  • It is not known exactly how many cars on the road are unwarranted or unregistered, but about 10% of the vehicles involved in crashes do not have a current warrant of fitness. The recently-introduced highway patrols should help to improve enforcement in this area. The vehicle impoundment regime introduced in the Land Transport Act is also removing some of these vehicles from our roads.
    
    
• Greater restrictions are required on the imports of used vehicles. Our vehicle fleet is too old.
  
  • This issue is currently being considered. The aim is to provide consumers with a range of affordable, safe vehicles. Generally, the newer the vehicle design, the safer the vehicle will be. However, restricting used imports would increase the price of all vehicles, making newer, safer models less affordable, especially for people who currently own older vehicles.
    
    
  • Improvements in vehicle standards over the next ten years are expected to provide the 3^rd largest safety gain of the interventions evaluated for the proposed Strategy. They are likely to reduce social cost by up to 16%. Vehicle safety is expected to improve over the coming decade as technological advances that have already been accepted permeate into the national fleet.
    
    
• Extra customs duty should be applied to cars found to be unsafe in crash test results.
  
  • This would be impractical, because not all models are tested. Also, it would discriminate against newer models on sale in certain markets, such as Australia, where testing is carried out, and in favour of older, less safe models. However, it is considered beneficial to publicise the test results, which has been shown in the US and Europe to have a major influence on purchasing decisions. The LTSA is a member of the Australian New Car Assessment Programme (ANCAP). ANCAP tests judge the protection provided to front-seat occupants wearing safety belts in serious head-on and side-impact crashes. The LTSA makes these test results freely available and provides them on its website. In addition, a number of links are provided to international crash test sites with information on a wider range of vehicles.
    
    
• Vehicles offered for sale should be "tagged" as being unsafe if they have achieved poor ratings in recognised crash tests, or been shown to display inferior crashworthiness in actual road crashes.
  
  • This is in effect what is already occurring with the publicising of current test results. However, actual "tagging" of vehicles would discriminate against newer models on sale from markets where testing is carried out, and in favour of older, less safe models. Publicising the test results is favoured, as it has been shown to be a major influence on purchasing decisions.
    
    
• The new vehicle impoundment regime should be extended.
  
  • New Zealand's vehicle impoundment regime appears to have had a very positive impact on reducing serious traffic offending (e.g. disqualified driving), which is entirely consistent with the impacts of similar regimes operating in other overseas jurisdictions. However, the new regime would need to be fully evaluated before consideration was given to extending the scheme. Approximately four years' data would be needed before an adequate evaluation could be undertaken.
    
    
• All motorists should be required to drive with their headlights on at all times.
  
  • Overseas studies have revealed there is a positive relationship between road safety and the use of daytime running lights. When daytime running lights are installed in a vehicle, the headlights switch on automatically when the motor is started. The road safety effect is related to the latitude in which they are being used. The reduction in multi-vehicle crashes due to daytime running lights overseas decreases as the latitude of the country decreases. Countries at high latitudes have low ambient light conditions in winter and long twilight periods in the summer, which make vehicle visibility poor. As New Zealand is at a relatively low latitude, any estimate of a decrease in multi-vehicle crashes would have to take this into account when comparing this country with those where daytime running lights are required.
    
    
  • In the Netherlands a formula was developed from the results of several international studies that examined the effectiveness of using headlights during the daytime. Applied to New Zealand the formula showed that the savings in multi-vehicle crashes from using headlights during the daytime would not outweigh the costs. These costs would include increased bulb usage, petrol usage and environmental costs. However, using the same formula to calculate the effectiveness of extending the legal hours of darkness to include all of dawn and dusk, as presented in the Strategy, revealed that the benefits would outweigh the costs.
    
    
  • Requiring daytime running lights would necessitate a major retro-fitting programme — not just to old cars (if this was to be required), but also to brand new cars as they entered the country. Most vehicles in NZ are imported completely built-up to the standards recognised in the main markets of the world. These jurisdictions do not require daytime running lights. Retro-fitting costs are considerable, and there would be compatibility problems with recently-developed vehicle lighting technology. Taking all the factors into account, the costs of introducing daytime running lights would probably exceed the safety benefits.
    
    
  • Extending the legal hours of darkness by an hour at each end of the day is likely to require vehicles to drive with their lights on during the periods of lowest ambient light, when the potential benefits of daytime running lights are greatest. This law change could be made without the costs of retro-fitting control devices to vehicles, which is why this option was presented in the proposed Strategy.
    
    
• It should be illegal to use mobile phones while driving.
  
  • International research identifies cellular phone use while driving as a safety risk to drivers, their passengers and other road users. The LTSA is currently reviewing this issue as part of a project looking at the existing road rules (the 'Road User Rule').
    
    
  • In New Zealand, despite the ever-increasing number of cellular phone users, the number of reported cellular phone-related crashes is relatively small. New Zealand already has legislation that can be used to prosecute drivers who cause crashes because of their use of cellular phones while driving (sections 7 and 8 of the Land Transport Act 1998). A law specifically banning cellular phone use while driving would be difficult and costly to enforce, particularly if drivers chose to contest in court their use of a cellular phone while driving.
    
    
  • Other policy issues also have to be considered, such as whether it would be necessary to ban radio telephones, CB radios, electronic pagers and computer-aided dispatchers, as these devices could be equally distracting to drivers. This consideration would have implications for a wide range of occupational drivers.
    
    
  • In addition, the existing safety and non-safety benefits, such as being able to report dangerous driving and serious crashes immediately to the Police from one's vehicle, and being able to respond quickly to business clients and colleagues, would be significantly reduced with a ban.
    
    
• The give-way-to-the-right rule needs to be reviewed, especially for left turns.
  
  • This rule is currently being reviewed, and the LTSA will make public its proposals later this year. Full public consultation on any changes proposed will be undertaken in the draft Land Transport Rule for Road User Behaviour which it is intended to issue later this year.
    
    
• NZ needs an Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) Strategy to ensure the possibilities are fully researched and can be fully utilised.
  
  • ITS developments overseas are being monitored closely. The Government may address the possibilities provided by ITS in its proposed NZ Transport Strategy. The implications of ITS developments for New Zealand's road safety effort will need to be monitored and considered on an on-going basis.
    
    
• Hidden Speed Cameras should be used.
  
  • The speed camera programme is a key intervention in the current road safety strategy. A recent trial of hidden speed cameras in the central North Island found that mean traffic speeds fell by about 1.6 km/h, and road crash injuries by 19%. This trial was an important exercise and demonstrated the effect of reducing open road speeds. Whether or not hidden speed cameras should be used in the future is a matter for the Government to weigh up in the context of other potential safety initiatives.
    
    
• Drug-affected drivers should be targeted, and means of testing them developed
  
  • While the effect of alcohol on driving performance is reasonably well known, the relationship between drugs and driving is both less predictable and less well understood. For example, it is not clear from the research whether cannabis alone affects driving. However, there are relatively strong indications that the combination of cannabis and alcohol is very risky.
    
    
  • Unlike alcohol, many legal and illegal drugs remain in bodily tissues long after they have been ingested and their effects on behaviour have worn off. This makes testing for drugs difficult. For instance there is currently no reliable method of relating cannabis metabolites in body fluid to the level of intoxication at the time of sampling the bodily fluid. Consequently, roadside screening akin to that for alcohol is not possible for cannabis.
    
    
  • The only method currently available to the Police for detecting drugged drivers, including drivers affected by cannabis, is the observation of impaired driving behaviour. Once the behavioural signs are observed, samples of bodily fluids need to be collected and analysed to provide supporting evidence. Both the bodily fluid analysis, and the training of police officers to effectively observe and record behaviour, are expensive and time consuming. In New Zealand Police testing of drivers for drugs is done only rarely, when there is a high degree of suspicion, due to the high analysis costs.
    
    
  • Research in this area will continue to be reviewed, and proposals will be made on programmes where they are likely to prove cost effective. Typically the approach is to educate people not to drive while intoxicated, and doctors and pharmacists also warn patients about the known adverse effects on driving of particular prescription drugs. The LTSA, through its publication "Medical Fitness to Drive" counsels medical personnel to bring the adverse effects of prescription drugs to their patients' attention.
    
    

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Page created: 23 September 2002